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Abstract 
The fate of British finance following the Brexit referendum revolves around the “resilience 
or relocation” debate: will the City of London continue to thrive as the world’s leading fi-
nancial centre, or will the bulk of its activity move to rival hubs after departure from EU 
trading arrangements? Despite extensive commentary, there remains no systematic analysis 
of this question since the Leave vote. This paper addresses that lacuna by evaluating the em-
pirical evidence concerning jobs, investments, and share of key trading markets (between 
June 2016 and May 2020). Contrary to widely held expectations, the evidence suggests that 
the City has been remarkably resilient. Brexit has had no significant impact on jobs and 
London has consolidated its position as the chief location for financial FDI, FinTech fund-
ing, and attracting new firms. Most unexpectedly, the City has increased its dominance in 
major infrastructure markets such as (euro-denominated) clearing, derivatives, and foreign 
exchange – although it has lost out in the handling of European repurchase agreements. 
Based upon this evidence, the paper argues that the UK’s negotiating position is stronger 
than typically recognised, and outlines the competitive ramifications for both the UK and 
EU financial sector.
Keywords: Brexit, City of London, European Union, financial services, resilience or reloca-
tion, United Kingdom
Zusammenfassung
„Resilience“ oder „relocation“? Das Schicksal des britischen Finanzsektors nach dem Brexit-
Referendum ist Gegenstand lebhafter Debatten: Wird die City of London ihre Bedeutung 
als einer der weltweit führenden Finanzplätze wahren oder wird ein Großteil ihrer Tätig-
keiten nach dem Austritt aus den EU-Handelsverträgen an konkurrierende Standorte verla-
gert? Trotz zahlreicher Meinungsäußerungen liegt seit der Ausstiegsentscheidung Großbri-
tanniens keine systematische Analyse dieser Frage vor. Um diese Lücke zu füllen, wertet das 
vorliegende Papier die empirische Evidenz in Bezug auf Arbeitsplätze, Investitionen und 
Anteile an den wichtigsten Handelsmärkten (zwischen Juni 2016 und Mai 2020) aus. Ent-
gegen weitläufigen Annahmen deuten die Auswertungsergebnisse darauf hin, dass sich die 
City als bemerkenswert resilient erweist. Der Brexit hatte bis heute keine signifikanten Aus-
wirkungen auf den Arbeitsmarkt, London konnte weiterhin neue Unternehmen anwerben 
und seine Position als wichtigster Standort für ausländische Direktinvestitionen und die 
Finanzierung von FinTech festigen. Am meisten jedoch dürfte überraschen, dass die City 
ihre Dominanz auf wichtigen Infrastrukturmärkten, wie denen für das (Euro-)Clearing, für 
Derivate und Devisen, ausbauen konnte – wenngleich sie bei der Abwicklung europäischer 
Rückkaufvereinbarungen Einbußen zu verzeichnen hat. Auf Basis dieser Erkenntnisse ar-
gumentiert das Papier, dass die britische Verhandlungsposition stärker ist als gemeinhin 
angenommen, und umreißt die Folgen dieses Umstands für die Durchsetzungschancen so-
wohl des britischen als auch des EU-Finanzsektors.
Schlagwörter: Brexit, City of London, Europäische Union, Finanzdienstleistungen, Groß-
britannien, Resilienz, Standortverlagerung
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Resilience or Relocation? Expectations and Reality in the 
City of London since the Brexit Referendum
1 Introduction
Resilience or relocation is the dominant frame of discussion concerning the potential 
impact of Brexit on the City of London.1 The argument for relocation is straightforward: 
as the City loses passporting rights to EU member states (henceforth, EU27), it will not 
only lose lucrative business but also be diminished in its relative competitiveness and 
standing as the world’s premier financial hub. Indeed, for a majority of analysts, the die 
is already cast, as firms and investors have been preparing since the Leave vote for “day 
one” of the UK’s Single Market exit. Journalistic commentary in this vein is abundant 
and is supported by a growing range of policymaking and academic analyses, while dis-
senting voices are scarce.
The discussion revolves around a cluster of core questions: how many jobs have moved 
since the June 2016 referendum, and how many more will follow? What firms are ex-
panding EU27 operations, and how has the vote impacted financial Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI)? In particular, what are the calculations of major (especially, US) invest-
ment banks that use London as their primary base of activity? Furthermore, what will 
be the fate of London’s celebrated infrastructure markets involving euro-denominated 
clearing, derivatives, and currencies? How much of this business will be lured to, for 
example, Euronext Paris or Deutsche Börse/Eurex in Frankfurt?
A major deficiency in these discussions, however, is that they often occur at the level 
of anecdote. This is particularly the case throughout the business press as reports high-
light isolated instances of transfer and relate this back to (unsubstantiated) claims that 
relocation is inevitable. Even when sophisticated analyses appear, they overwhelmingly 
focus on one direction of travel, from the City to the continent, rather than transfers go-
ing the opposite way. The same applies to the multiple professional impact assessments 
(discussed below) that made stark claims concerning the amount of jobs and invest-
ment that would immediately flee following a vote to Leave. In short, what is lacking is 
a more systematic analysis of the empirical evidence for relocation that has (or has not) 
occurred in the four years since the referendum. That is the primary task of this paper. 
For numerous discussions and helpful comments on this paper, the author wishes to thank Tobias 
Arbogast, Lucio Baccaro, Puneet Bhasin, Benjamin Braun, Fabio Bulfone, Jan Fichtner, Tod Van 
Gunten, Niamh Hardiman, Arjen van der Heide, Martin Höpner, Kathleen Lynch, Benjamin Martill, 
Sidney Rothstein, Lisa Suckert, and Leon Wansleben.
1 I follow convention by using the term City of London to refer the UK financial sector more 
broadly. 
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Through a detailed analysis of recent market trends across jobs, investment, and share of 
key trading markets – from June 2016 to May 2020 – this study serves to recalibrate the 
“relocation vs. resilience” debate, challenging some core assumptions and expectations. 
Specifically, the paper demonstrates that the widespread claim of London being signifi-
cantly damaged in the years following the referendum is false. Rather, in jobs, there has 
been no noticeable effect; in investments, the City remains exceptionally robust in FDI, 
Fintech funding, and in attracting financial firms; and in the share of key trading mar-
kets, there is simply no doubt that the City has dramatically increased its dominance 
across most markets.
These findings indicate that the EU economy remains disproportionally dependent on 
London’s financial services – a situation that gives the UK government a significant 
source of negotiating leverage. While this view on the negotiating balance of power is 
largely overlooked by analysts, it coheres well with the actions of both sides during the 
negotiations: for instance, the belligerent stance of successive UK governments, and the 
EU’s willingness to preserve financial trading relations in the face of a no-deal outcome 
in early 2019. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that investors retain a high degree of confidence in Lon-
don’s ability to remain competitive outside of the Single Market, for reasons which will 
be elaborated upon through a variety of theoretical frames. As for the EU, policymakers 
must navigate the complex task of reducing their acute dependence on London while 
simultaneously advancing the regional process of financial integration.
In conducting this analysis, the paper acknowledges that, as the Brexit process is not 
finalised, the City has not yet, in substance, moved to new trading arrangements. In 
this respect, the analysis offers no prediction as to what kind of damage will or will not 
happen to the City (or EU27 centres) going forward. Indeed, Brexit is an inherently un-
predictable process and much remains to be resolved in ongoing negotiations – in par-
ticular, equivalence2 determinations. Nevertheless, as both future scholarship and policy 
choices are unavoidably premised upon prior investigation, this paper does serve to tem-
per some of the more pessimistic expectations regarding the future prospects of London.
The paper proceeds in six parts. The first section gives an overview of the resilience vs. 
relocation debate, followed by three sections that assess the empirical evidence sequen-
tially across jobs, investments, and trading markets. The fifth section elaborates on the 
implications of this evidence for the wider literature, specifically as it relates to ongoing 
Brexit negotiations and the competitive prospects of both (UK and EU) financial sys-
tems. It also surveys a selection of theoretical frameworks within which London’s resil-
ience can be understood. The conclusion indicates several directions for future research.
2 Equivalence is a regime whereby third-country financial institutions may provide services to 
EU27 countries if the regulatory standards and rules in their home country are found to be in 
close alignment/compliance with the EU’s regulatory framework.
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2 The prospects of relocation
The central theme concerning Brexit and finance is the prospect of a relocation of ser-
vices from the City to mainland European hubs. The conventional wisdom is that, in 
the aftermath of the 2016 vote, not only are firms preparing to relocate in order to con-
tinue servicing EU27 clients (Schelkle 2018, 125–27; Pesendorfer 2020, 193–245) but 
national and regional authorities are making proactive efforts to help their respective 
centres in luring business from London (Howarth and Quaglia 2018; Cassis and Wójcik 
2018). In a typical rendition of this argument, Lavery, McDaniel, and Schmid (2018, 
1516) conclude that European financial centres are “set to benefit” from the impending 
separation of UK and EU markets, despite the likelihood that overall transaction costs 
will increase for businesses, states, and households. 
This perspective is supported by most policymaking commentary. In the ominously 
titled “When the banks leave”, financial markets specialist Nicolas Verón (2017) de-
clares that “harm is now unavoidable” for the City which will “suffer relative both to 
its competitors and to how it would have performed without Brexit and probably in 
absolute terms as well”. While London may succeed in retaining domestic business, the 
author predicts at best a “permanent loss of most of the City’s EU27-related business” 
and at worst a loss of its international activities also. Further pessimistic assessments 
are abundant across expert commentary, with one report after another expecting sig-
nificant damage to London’s standing (Wright, Benson, and Hamre 2019; Schoenmaker 
2017; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2016). This narrative is also ubiquitous within journal-
istic reporting, as a plethora of articles anticipate and track the transfer of jobs and 
investment from London to rival centres (e.g. Jenkins and Morris 2018).
Another factor considered damaging to the City’s interests is the UK’s particularly weak 
negotiating position. Unlike the EU’s purported consistency in financial aims, the con-
flicted (and heavily constrained) preferences of Britain’s main players – the government, 
regulators, and private finance – are perceived as undermining the UK’s bargaining 
influence. As a result, James and Quaglia argue that “the costs of no agreement remain 
significantly higher for the UK than for the EU, and have increased steadily over the 
course of the Brexit negotiations” (2018, 566).
In light of these claims, observers often present Brexit in terms of national self-sabo-
tage (Toporowski 2017) and infer that the political influence of the financial sector has 
waned. It is claimed, for instance, that several policymaking contingencies – e.g. party 
management, institutional reorganisation, sectoral factionalism – have overwhelmed 
the structural power of British finance, and led to the pursuit of a harder Brexit than 
the City hoped (James and Quaglia 2019a). Others see Brexit as a critical juncture that, 
in combination with the reputational damage from the 2007/08 crash, marks a fun-
damental decline in the policymaking influence of City-based elites (Thompson 2017; 
Rosamond 2019).
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Finally, taking stock of these perspectives, several leading authors have contemplated 
more broadly the potential decline or restructuring of the distinctive UK growth model, 
based as it is so prominently on the existence of a thriving financial services sector (Hay 
and Bailey 2019).
Despite this general consensus, a handful of authors question these claims. Ringe argues 
that while Brexit appears damaging, experience of EU law-making suggests that it will 
turn out to be an “irrelevance” due to the mutual interest of both British and EU policy-
makers in preserving open financial relations. As such, “creative solutions” that formal-
ly satisfy the withdrawal procedure will, in substance, keep London closely connected 
to EU markets (2018, 22). Offering empirical support for this proposition, Kalaitzake 
(2020) documents how a wide range of financial contingency arrangements were de-
signed by UK and EU policymakers when threatened with the prospect of a disorderly 
no-deal Brexit in early 2019. Leveraging a concept of “structural interdependence”, Ka-
laitzake argues that the prospect of mutual economic harm persuades policymakers to 
avoid severing deep-rooted ties between London and EU corporates.
More broadly, Talani (2019) maintains that the combination of London’s unique com-
petitive strengths with a particularly favourable set of government interventions and 
support will allow the City to prosper globally through a strategy of “pragmatic adap-
tation”. In addition, Lysandrou, Nesvetailova, and Palan outline the huge advantage of 
scale in liquidity that London holds over its EU27 competitors, rendering it “unlikely 
that…relocation [from London] will occur any time soon” (2017, 173). This view is sup-
ported by a minority of policy commentators who show that equivalence can substan-
tially mitigate the most serious damage to the City’s commercial interests (Scarpetta 
and Booth 2016), and, indeed, might be a better strategic goal for the UK government, 
rather than becoming a straight “rule taker” of future EU regulations (Armour 2017).
Largely missing from these discussions, however, is a systematic empirical analysis of 
how the City of London is actually faring since the referendum. That is, to ask how 
much “relocation” has actually occurred thus far, and how is London holding up com-
pared to continental rivals? Of course, there is an unspecified time-lag in any movement 
of business across jurisdictions, especially as the future partnership agreement will only 
be fully enacted in January 2021. Nevertheless, the four years since the UK’s decision 
to leave offers a substantial period of time to identify prominent trends within financial 
sub-sectors and track relocation across several domains of market activity. 
Crucially, analysts warned that the transfer of services would begin immediately after 
the referendum and continue throughout the negotiation process. This is because com-
panies must plan in advance for day one of business with the City outside of the EU27 
bloc. Such urgency is exacerbated by policymakers encouraging firms to develop their 
contingency preparations as soon as possible. Moreover, many commentators have con-
tended that the uncertainty arising from drawn-out negotiations is presently hurting 
the City’s financial standing (Hamre and Wright 2019). 
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In short, if the thesis of relocation is correct, one would expect the data to illustrate 
that, at a minimum, there has been a distinctive movement (if not a full-blown flight) 
of financial activity from London to the EU mainland as businesses implement their 
post-settlement preparations. In evaluating this expectation, then, the following section 
examines the rationale and evidence for relocation across three areas: jobs, investment, 
and trading market share. Each area is a key discussion point of those warning of relo-
cation and the damaging impact of Brexit on the future of London.
Jobs
Within commentary on relocation, jobs are the most commonly used proxy for analys-
ing the future fate of the City. Table 1 lists several prominent reports that have projected 
the amount of financial sector job losses that will result from Brexit, displaying a general 
trend downwards in expected losses as time passes.
The most widely circulated estimate of job losses came from a PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) report published in April 2016 and is consistently cited in both academic and 
non-academic literature (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2016). The report estimated that, 
under a Leave scenario, 70,000 to 100,000 financial jobs would be lost by the year 2020. 
Crucially, this figure was presented as a near-term prediction, with long-term labour 
market adjustments mitigating that loss by 10,000 to 30,000 by the year 2030.3 
Soon after the referendum, an Oliver Wyman (2016) assessment estimated that, with a 
retention of full passporting rights,4 the UK could limit job losses to a negligible 3,500. 
However, under a scenario more aligned to how negotiations have actually developed – 
whereby the UK becomes a third country but (potentially) gains EU27 access through 
equivalence, delegation,5 and/or bilateral agreements – the report projects employment 
losses of 31,000 to 35,000.6 By the end of 2016, an Ernst & Young (EY) report – circulated 
widely among government officials – envisaged losses closer to the PwC tally. Focusing 
on the prized euro-denominated clearing market, the report speculated that within eight 
years 30,000 jobs would flow from the UK to alternative “core intermediary” positions 
3 The lower figure assumes a loss of passporting rights after an UK-EU agreement, while the 
higher figure envisages a return to WTO terms in the event of a no-deal Brexit.
4 This would involve not only full equivalence approval across all Single Market directives but 
also agreement on new access arrangements where equivalence provisions are not currently 
available.
5 Delegation is a practice whereby funds officially domiciled within EU27 countries “delegate” 
their business to portfolio managers based in the UK in order to access the City’s huge pools 
of liquidity and lower trading costs. Approximately 90 percent of assets under management 
within the EU utilise the delegation model, the majority of which diverts trading back to Lon-
don (Mooney and Thompson 2017).
6 Under a more damaging scenario in which no equivalence is given and other restrictions arise, 
job loss estimates rise to 70,000.
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abroad. In addition, losses of 15,000 in wealth management and similar numbers in both 
related professional and technology roles would bring the total to 83,000. In a driving 
sector of the UK economy, these job losses are expected to produce a domino effect, 
ultimately costing 232,000 jobs across the entire UK economy by 2024 (Stafford 2016).
Throughout 2017, estimates began to moderate. In February, Bruegel declared that 
“30,000 people might relocate from London to the EU27”, with 10,000 losses in whole-
sale banking and the remainder connected to supportive professional roles (law, audit-
ing, technology) (Batsaikhan, Kalcik, and Schoenmaker 2017). Later in the year, EY’s 
new Brexit “job tracker” predicted that 10,500 jobs would be lost on “day one” (Treanor 
2017). Estimates continued to be pared back as it became clear that expected levels of 
relocation were not occurring, and officials such as Ian McCafferty, a senior Bank of 
England (BoE) economist, were publicly taken to task for groundless claims of an “exo-
dus” of workers from the City to Europe.7 In July 2018, the City of London Corporation 
lowered their expectations to between 5,000 and 13,000 positions migrating before the 
exit date of March 2019 (BBC 2018), while the BoE stated their revised view that ap-
proximately 5,000 jobs would relocate before the UK’s departure (Jones 2018a).
As Figure 1 illustrates, the referendum aftermath has caused no significant harm to 
overall employment levels in the UK financial sector. In the four quarters directly after 
the Leave vote, job levels in financial services proper (i.e. exclusive of related profession-
al services) increased considerably to reach an overall employment level of 1,055,000 – 
approximately 15,000 jobs more than at the time of the referendum in June 2016. While 
employment levels did take a noticeable drop in the summer of 2018, they quickly re-
covered to previous peak levels again in early 2019. As such, current levels of employ-
ment are substantially higher than they were before the referendum. 
Confirmation of the stability in UK financial sector employment also comes indirectly 
from tax receipts generated by the sector. According to annual reports by the City of 
London Corporation, the overall tax contribution from finance to the UK government 
7 Ian McCafferty, interview by Iain Dale, Iain Dale, LBC Radio, August 7, 2018, https://www.lbc.
co.uk/radio/presenters/iain-dale/brexit-exodus-eu-bankers-underway-bank-of-england/
Table 1 Estimated job losses in prominent impact assessments
Conducted by Release date Commissioned by Estimated losses
PwC April 2016 TheCityUK 70–100,000
Oliver Wyman October 2016 TheCityUK 3,500; 33,500; 70,000a
Ernst & Young November 2016 LSE Group 83,000
Bruegel February 2017 – 30,000
Ernst & Young December 2017 (EY Tracker series) 10,000
City of London Corp. July 2018 – 5,000–13,000
Ernst & Young September 2019 (EY Tracker series) 7,000
a This variation is based upon three distinct scenarios with figures indicating the mid-point of expected job 
losses.
Source: All assessments cited in main text.
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has experienced a steady yearly increase since 2010 and hit a record of £75.5 billion in 
2019. This compares with a tax intake of £66 billion during 2015, or rather, an increase 
of 14 percent since around the time of the Brexit referendum. Particularly revealing is 
the fact that the largest component of this intake comes from employment taxes, consti-
tuting £34.5 billion (or 46 percent) of total financial sector tax receipts. As UK financial 
employees represent only 3.2 percent of the total workforce, yet consistently make up 
approximately 11 percent of overall government receipts, the latest Corporation report 
declares the financial sector to be a “significant and stable contributor to the UK’s tax 
take” (City of London Corporation 2019).
Crucial to the resilience of UK financial sector employment is the fact that major finan-
cial firms – in particular, large City-based investment banks – substantially revised their 
initial plans to move jobs to the continent. As reported by Bloomberg in 2019, virtually 
all of the major investment banks dramatically scaled back their level of employees 
flagged for relocation. For instance, the three banks that indicated the largest level of 
Brexit transfers (JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, and UBS) lowered their combined trans-
fers from 9,500 employees to just 1,100 (Finch, Warren, and Hadfield 2019). Moreover, 
these reduced figures constitute planned relocations, meaning that many of them may 
well not materialise. Indeed, a persistent fear of EU regulators is that financial firms will 
end up establishing “empty shell” operations within their jurisdictions while keeping 
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Verification of the broad non-relocation of these jobs comes from the EY Brexit tracker, 
which showed that, by September 2019, a mere 1,000 positions had been transferred by 
the major UK-based investment banks – movements characterised as a “trickle” rather 
than the expected “exodus” (Brush 2019). In their Tracker report, EY again revised their 
predictions downwards to now indicate that only 7,000 jobs would relocate “in the near 
future” (Jones 2019). Moreover, this does not account for the considerable number of 
jobs that seem likely to migrate into London as a result of EU27 firms seeking assured 
access to the City after Brexit (Bovill consultants 2020).
In short, there is no compelling evidence to date that the Leave decision, or, for that 
matter, the persistent uncertainty surrounding Brexit negotiations, has had any signifi-
cant impact on UK financial sector employment levels.
Investments
On investments, analysts stress that financial firms have flagged approximately £1 tril-
lion of assets for relocation from London to the continent – albeit, again, mostly refer-
ring to planned rather than actualised transfers. Using these intentions as a baseline ex-
pectation, however, commentators have looked beyond jobs to assess the gradual trans-
fer of firms’ operations and activities which could serve as the “building blocks” to more 
permanent business on the continent (Brush 2019). Once more, the actions of large 
investment banks are a central focus and there has been a constant stream of reporting 
on banks expanding operations and buying office space in alternative EU centres, as 
well as speculation over which city is the main beneficiary of Brexit. For instance, Mor-
gan Stanley’s application for a German licence spurred the contention that Frankfurt 
would be the firm’s new post-Brexit hub, as did the intention by Barclays, Lloyds, and 
Citigroup to increase operations there. Alternatively, the discussion turns to Paris due 
to its similar post-Brexit attraction of big names such as Bank of America, Goldman 
Sachs, and HSBC, and its status as a major world metropolis (unlike Frankfurt) that can 
attract global talent (Jenkins and Morris 2018). 
More detailed industry reports, however, indicate that smaller European centres are 
coming out on top. According to a widely publicised New Financial assessment, Dublin 
is the “clear winner” based on a comprehensive analysis of the 332 UK-based firms that 
have either relocated a part of their business or flagged their intention to set up a new 
EU27 entity (Wright, Benson, and Hamre 2019; Hamre and Wright 2019). Between 
2016 and 2019, Dublin had 115 firms choose it as their destination (constituting 28 
percent of all actions), while Luxemburg came in second place with seventy-one firms. 
Paris and Frankfurt were third and fourth (sixty-nine and forty-five firms respectively), 
and Amsterdam fifth (forty firms). A key reason for the success of Dublin and Luxem-
burg is the fact that they attract asset management firms – entities that are relatively 
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more mobile and have been the most active in making moves since the referendum.8 By 
contrast, Frankfurt attracts the most banking-orientated firms, Amsterdam is a particu-
lar draw for exchanges and broking firms, while Paris attracts a mixture of firm types.
Based on this activity, the report predicts that these locations will “gradually chip away 
at the UK’s influence in the banking and finance industry not just in Europe but around 
the world” (Wright, Benson, and Hamre 2019, 3). However, the chief deficiency of such 
studies is that they significantly underestimate potential investments coming into the 
United Kingdom as a result of Brexit. This has been highlighted in stark fashion by a 
research investigation by the financial consultancy Bovill. Based upon a Freedom of 
Information request, the consultancy shows that the UK’s Temporary Permissions Re-
gime (TPR) – a transition scheme allowing firms to continue inbound passporting to 
the UK after Brexit, and until they receive full authorisation from British regulators – 
attracted an extraordinary 1,441 applications from financial firms. Crucially, more than 
one thousand (83 percent) of these firms currently use the EU passporting mechanism 
to offer services within the UK, meaning that these applications express the intention to 
set up some form of physical presence in the UK after the exit date. As noted by a part-
ner at Bovill, “in practical terms…European firms will be buying office space, hiring 
staff and engaging legal and professional advisers in the UK” (Bovill consultants 2020).
This clamour to ensure future ties with the City should come as little surprise given the 
vast array of new business opportunities and services available there. Indeed, the largest 
category of firm types looking for access was “advisors and intermediaries” accounting 
for approximately 18 percent (254) of total applications. This includes a wide variety 
of EU27 investment funds and brokers looking to service UK-based clients and secure 
services/transactions at the lowest cost. Tellingly, even in asset management – the firm 
category documented as being the “most active” in relocations – the UK TPR received 
141 firm applications, compared to ninety for EU27 hubs (Hamre and Wright 2019, 18).
Another counter to the investment relocation claim comes from EY’s yearly attractive-
ness surveys, which offer an assessment of UK FDI performance relative to other coun-
tries in Europe (Ernst & Young 2019a; 2019b). According to their latest reports (com-
paring data from 2017 and 2018), while the UK economy as a whole lost significant 
ground in FDI attraction – declining 13 percent in FDI projects compared to a fall of 
just 4 percent in Europe – finance was a major outlier. Within financial services, UK 
FDI projects registered an exceptional 44 percent increase over the previous year by at-
tracting 112 projects – the most ever recorded in the annual survey – and increasing the 
UK’s pan-European share of financial sector FDI to 27 percent (Table 2). Noteworthy, 
however, is the fact that this occurred in the context of a simultaneous rise in outward 
FDI by UK-based financial firms to continental Europe – albeit at a considerably more 
8 As per note 6, these firms are likely to secure post-Brexit access to London through the mecha-
nism of portfolio delegation, hence requiring a base in EU27 locations for back office activities 
(Riding 2019).
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modest rate of 16 percent. What this suggests is that, while financial firms are certainly 
expanding their EU27 operations, it is not necessarily at the expense of overall invest-
ment going to the City. 
Furthermore, the UK report’s concomitant survey of investors also exhibits positive 
sentiment for the City, with 22 percent of respondents believing that financial services 
will “drive the UK’s growth in the coming years”, compared to a score of just 13 percent 
for the digital economy and 12 percent for business services, coming in second and 
third place respectively (Ernst & Young 2019a, 36).
The resilience of investment into the UK financial sector involves a complex range of 
factors, two of which deserve special attention: first, the ongoing commitment of large 
multinational banks, and second, tech-related investment. 
While there is an inordinate level of focus on large banks seeking to expand EU27 op-
erations, significantly less attention is given to actions that link their future to the City, 
irrespective of Brexit. The most important of these come from the top US investment 
banks. In 2019, Goldman Sachs unveiled their new European HQ right in the centre 
of the City’s square mile – a £1.2 billion, ten-storey state-of-the-art complex that now 
houses London’s largest trading floor and brings 6,500 employees under one roof. Simi-
larly, despite leasing extra space in Paris in 2017, in February 2018, Bank of America 
extended their London HQ lease for another ten years (until 2032). When queried on 
the firm’s reasoning in the context of Brexit, CEO Brian Moynihan replied: “I think it 
[Brexit] is a negative, but I don’t think it is a strong negative” (Sidders 2018). The same 
applies to JP Morgan, which recently purchased a new office in Paris to “continue to 
serve European-based clients seamlessly”. Nevertheless, the bank’s head of French op-
erations stressed that “London will still be number one” – a statement verified by the 
fact that, while JP Morgan has 10,000 employees in London, it has just 260 employees in 
Paris, with room for only 450 more at the new location (Morris and Pooler 2020). These 
moves indicate that, while major banks are willing to use their substantial resources to 
expand EU27 operations and retain commercial flexibility, this should not be taken to 
mean that they also intend to sever ties with London.







UK overall FDI 1,205 1,045 Down 13%
EU27 overall FDI 5,448 5,311 Down 3%
UK finance FDI 78 112 Up 44%
EU27 finance FDI 263 304 Up 16%
UK manufacturing FDI 215 140 Down 35%
EU27 manufacturing FDI 1,767 1,729 Down 2%
Source: Ernst & Young (2019a; 2019b).
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Other large US and non-US firms have made comparable long-term, post-referendum 
investments in the City: Citigroup bought a forty-five-floor skyscraper at Canary Wharf 
for £1.2 billion, Wells Fargo purchased a new site to function as their main base for fu-
ture EMEA operations, and Sumitomo (Japan’s second largest bank) agreed a new twen-
ty-year lease for their London HQ (Spink 2019; Burke 2018; Blackman 2018). Even the 
major banks in Germany and France (Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Société Générale, 
Credit Agricole) have all confirmed that London will continue to be a central plank of 
their post-Brexit operations (Landauro 2018; Evans 2017).
On tech-related investment, there is no question that, despite Brexit, London continues 
to thrive as the leading European hub for FinTech development – the main driver of 
financial innovation over coming decades. A 2019 EY census report (comparing 2019 
with 2017 data) shows that UK FinTech companies increased their average investment 
by a third over those two years (Ernst & Young 2019c). Growth prospects were also 
found to be exceptionally strong, with over a fifth of companies projecting growth of 
200 percent over the next year and a third of firms expecting an initial public offering 
over the next five years. Similarly, Brexit did not disrupt London’s superior production 
of Fintech “unicorns” – start-up firms that achieve a valuation greater than $1 billion. 
Between 2016 and 2019, the UK witnessed the development of nine FinTech unicorns, 
including major online challenger banks such as Revolut and Monzo. By contrast, Ger-
many produced three, while France produced none.9
FinTech is undoubtedly the spearhead of London’s ability to attract investment into tech-
nology more generally. According to a comprehensive analysis of venture capital invest-
ment data over the last six years, the UK has consistently increased its lead over its core 
European rivals, driven primarily by longstanding links with the US investment com-
munity (Tech Nation 2019, 5). On average, between 2016 and 2019, the UK secured $9.4 
billion annually in venture capital investment, compared to just $4.5 billion in Germany 
and $3.6 billion in France (Figure 2). In FinTech specifically – designated as one of the 
three “key tech sub-sectors” along with AI and cleantech – the UK saw an enormous 96 
percent increase in its venture capital investments from 2018 to 2019, compared to a 73 
percent and 61 percent rise in Germany and France respectively (Tech Nation 2020).
Overall, then, there is a slightly more nuanced story in the area of investment compared 
to jobs. On the one hand, it is definitely true that some UK-based firms – in particular, 
mobile asset management firms and large banks – have made multiple relocations to 
ensure continuity in operational capacities across EU27 jurisdictions. However, this 
has not negatively impacted UK financial FDI levels, which remain exceptionally ro-
bust and clearly show that the UK is not losing ground relative to continental rivals. 
On the contrary, UK investment in keys areas like FinTech continues to outstrip that 
of its EU27 competitors by a considerable margin, while the number of firms looking 
to establish a presence in the UK after Brexit appears to match or exceed those moving 
9 Unicorn data available at: https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies.
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in the opposite direction. Similarly, the continuing operational expansion of global in-
vestment banks in their UK headquarters is a key marker of the long-term confidence 
placed in the City.
Trading market share
One of the most frequently cited threats facing the City is the prospect of losing market 
share in the lucrative market infrastructure business in which London holds a domi-
nant international position. In particular, this relates to the high proportion of deriva-
tives trading and foreign exchange (FX) currency activities handled by the City’s major 
dealers and central counterparties (CCPs). Even more specifically, it refers to the vast 
number of euro-denominated transactions managed and cleared by London, and which 
would fall outside the EU’s supervisory purview after Brexit.
In terms of London’s dominant position, note that, at the time of the 2016 referendum, 
UK dealers handled 78 percent of all FX trading executed within the EU, including 43 
percent of (global) euro foreign transactions and 69 percent of EU-based euro currency 
trading (European Central Bank 2017, 29). Overall, this meant London traded approxi-
mately twice the number of euros than all of the eurozone countries combined. Similarly, 
UK CCPs cleared 82 percent of all EU-traded Interest Rate Derivatives (IRDs) – by far 
the most commonly used derivative by corporates and investors – and 75 percent of 
euro-denominated IRDs (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2018, 7). More generally, UK mar-
Figure 2 Venture capital investment 2016–2019, including averages, 














Source: Tech Nation 2020.
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kets cleared 70 percent of all euro-denominated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
compared with French clearing of 11 percent and German clearing of 7 percent (Eu-
ropean Parliament 2017, 47). Central to London’s advantage are “margin pool benefits” 
that derive from UK CCPs’ handling of multicurrency trades across instruments, giving 
them the capacity to significantly compress collateral requirements by offsetting differ-
ent payment positions among customers. By contrast, French and German CCPs are too 
small in scale to engage similar portfolio efficiencies (European Parliament 2017, 46–48).
Nevertheless, damage to London’s position is often considered an inevitability. Schoen-
maker, for instance, specifies euro-denominated clearing in derivatives as the market 
segment that will face the “greatest impact”, speculating that up to half of the City’s IRD 
transactions “could move to continental Europe after Brexit” (2017, 10–11). Similarly, 
Charlie Bean (deputy BoE governor, 2008–2014) stated soon after the referendum that 
he had “absolutely no doubt at all” that euro-denominated IRD clearing would shift to 
EU27 jurisdictions (Pratley 2016).
Indeed, several post-referendum developments indicate that the relocation of various 
instruments is a distinct possibility. One headline development is the considerable shift 
in repurchase agreements (repos). In 2018, London Clearing House (LCH) announced 
that it would increase provision of clearing in these instruments at its Paris-based sub-
sidiary. LCH made this decision on the basis that EU27 firms could simultaneously 
“net” their bond transactions with the ECB at the same location (Stafford 2017a). In this 
respect, the move is actually part of a larger LCH efficiency strategy initiated before the 
Brexit referendum, but nonetheless given further impetus by an impending UK exit 
(Jones 2018b). The move also had an underlying political logic: as the LCH chief Daniel 
McGuire acknowledged, the ECB has a legitimate interest in keeping repos – a primary 
channel of monetary policy transmission – under their direct supervision. At the same 
time, however, McGuire hoped that the ECB would appreciate the sharp “distinction” 
between repo trading and LCH’s even more lucrative IRD market – the latter of which 
would be damaged by a similar relocation due to the loss of London’s exclusive margin 
pool benefits (hence reducing liquidity and increasing costs for end users), and is irrel-
evant to monetary policy (Jones 2018b).
Other limited business transfers have occurred both on the provider and client side, 
often as a result of explicit poaching tactics. Eurex – the clearing platform owned by 
Deutsche Börse – has been particularly aggressive in this regard. In 2017, it recruited 
over twenty investment banks onto its new profit-sharing incentive scheme as a means 
to boost trading volumes (Stafford 2017b). Similarly, in 2019, Dekabank – a key inter-
mediary for German savings banks – took a significant share of its derivatives booking 
business to the Eurex platform in order to avail of a 100 percent fee discount for relocat-
ing customers (Vaghela 2017).
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Despite these developments, however, official data by the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) provides a powerful counter to the notion that Brexit might loosen Lon-
don’s grip on trading markets. By good fortune, the BIS Central Bank Survey tracks 
dealing and clearing in FX and OTC derivatives markets on a triennial basis, with the 
most recent reports released in 2016 and 2019. As such, these surveys are perfectly 
placed to capture post-referendum market shifts.
Beginning with the prized OTC IRD market (Table 3), in April 2019, the UK recorded an 
average daily turnover in IRDs of $3.7 trillion, representing an 11 percent increase from 
three years earlier. As such, approximately half of the world IRDs are now handled in the 
UK. Crucially, this increased capture of global trading holds specifically in relation to eu-
ro-denominated contracts, as UK-based dealers registered a likewise 11 percent increase, 
taking their share of the euro-denominated IRDs from 75 percent in 2016 to a massive 
86 percent in 2019. These results are devastating from the perspective of those that see 
Brexit as an opportunity to grow their domestic centres: for instance, France (the second 
largest EU27 trader) saw their already meagre level of IRD turnover fall from $141 bil-
lion to just $120 billion, or from 4.6 percent of total global IRDs in 2016 to 1.6 percent in 
2019. Moreover – and contrary to the alternative hypothesis that business may relocate 
from London to non-European centres such as New York – the UK also increased its 
share of dollar-denominated IRD contracts by an extraordinary 19 percent.
A similar story emerges in relation to the FX market (Table 4). In this segment, the UK 
consolidated its position as the number one trading location, increasing its share of the 
global market by 6 percent and becoming responsible for 43.1 percent ($3,576 billion) 
of total FX activity. This compared with a decrease in both French (2.8 percent to 2 
percent) and German (1.8 percent to 1.5 percent) FX activity. Once again, in the most 
relevant sub-category of euro-related transactions, the UK increased its share of these 
trades by 4.5 percent, now handling 47.8 percent of all global euro FX dealings. Mean-
while, France and Germany registered increases of 1.3 percent and 0.1 percent respec-
tively, bringing their combined share of total euro FX transactions to just 8.3 percent (5 
percent in France; 3.3 percent in Germany). 
Table 3 Total IRDs and euro-denominated IRDs in UK, France, and Germany: 2016 and 2019 
(daily averages, in millions of US dollars)
2016 2019
UK France Germany UK France Germany
Total IRDs 1,180 141 31 3,670 120 56
Percent of global 38.8 4.6 1.0 50.2 1.6 0.8
Total euro IRDs 574 101 17 1,584 87 32
Percent of euro global 74.9 13.1 2.1 85.6 4.7 1.7
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2016a; 2019a); full data from all Triennial Survey reports, 
tables, commentaries, and interactive graphs available at https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx19.htm?m= 
6%7C32%7C617.
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Also instructive is the FX market for US dollars, specifically as it relates to FX swaps 
and the vital importance of these derivatives for major corporations’ liquidity and risk 
management.10 As FX swaps are typically conducted OTC and cleared by CCPs, Lon-
don offers a major pricing advantage for clients, as well as highly customised derivative 
products. Thus, in the context of Brexit, it might be expected that some of this business 
would migrate to the continent in order to ease the higher costs for EU27 firms once 
they lose unfettered access to the City. Nevertheless, once more, the BIS data shows 
London tightening its grip, capturing approximately 2.1 percent more of this rapidly 
growing market, while France and Germany decreased their share by 2.8 percent and 
0.6 percent respectively. Overall, London’s extensive dealer-clearing networks presently 
manage 39.2 percent of the global FX swaps market, compared to only 1.8 percent in 
Germany and 1.3 percent in France.
The growing dominance of the UK in these market segments is encapsulated by the stel-
lar post-referendum performance of London’s leading infrastructure services provider, 
the LSE Group. In 2017, the company reported a 31 percent clearing flows increase over 
2016 levels, resulting in record trading volumes across a range of products including 
(euro-denominated) IRDs, FX derivatives, and inflation swaps (Raman and Jones 2018). 
Similarly, in 2018, LSE reported a 30 percent increase in profits and a 12 percent climb 
in revenue for the first half of the year – results driven significantly by clearing activi-
ties and a 34 percent rise in demand for euro-denominated swaps (Hussain and Jones 
2018). In 2019, the Group again beat out analysts’ expectations as operating profit rose 
by 15 percent, total income by 9 percent, and clearing revenue by 13 percent (Hussain 
and Jones 2019). To put this remarkable four-year performance into context, LSE shares 
went from £25 on June 24, 2016, (the day after the Brexit referendum) to set off on a 
more or less permanent climb towards £79.50 on January 24, 2020 – a 318 percent rise 
in share valuation.
10 These swaps are crucial for protecting eurozone banks against currency exposure given the in-
ordinately high level of dollar-denominated bonds on their balance sheets. Moreover, they allow 
banks to use the dollar as a “substitute type” of repurchase agreement (Lysandrou, Nesvetailova, 
and Palan 2017, 170–71).
Table 4 FX total, FX euros, FX dollar swaps: 2016 and 2019 (daily averages, in millions of US 
dollars)
2016 2019
UK France Germany UK France Germany
Total FX 2,406 181 116 3,576 167 124
Percent total FX 36.9 2.8 1.7 43.1 2.0 1.5
FX euro 885 104 68 1,287 100 88
Percent total FX euro 43.3 5.0 3.3 47.8 3.7 3.2
FX dollar swaps 1,090 121 72 1,516 99 73
Percent FX dollar swaps 37.1 4.1 2.4 39.2 1.3 1.8
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2016b; 2019b).
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Overall, it is clear from the data that conventional expectations regarding the UK’s posi-
tion in key infrastructure markets have, thus far, proven to be incorrect. Against all ex-
pectations, the City has actually strengthened its dominance over most of these vital ser-
vices, rendering financial end users – and, in particular, end users of euro-denominated 
products – more dependent than ever on continued access to London. The one exception 
is in the domain of repos, the majority of which have migrated to EU27 jurisdictions due 
to efficiency benefits for continental end users (EU27 banks) and the necessity for the 
ECB to maintain direct control over this critical market for monetary policy transmis-
sion. Nevertheless, as noted in the case of LCH, this migration was already underway 
before the Brexit referendum, albeit at a more gradual and less urgent pace.
3 Implications of the City’s resilience 
The foregoing analysis has important implications for the wider literature on the po-
litical economy of UK-EU financial relations, three of which are elaborated upon here: 
namely, the balance of power within ongoing negotiations, the future competitive pros-
pects of both the UK and EU financial system, and various perspectives regarding the 
theoretical basis of London’s persistent superiority. 
Negotiating balance of power
A key analytic consequence of the City’s resilience is that the EU maintains a consider-
ably weaker negotiating position (vis-à-vis financial services) than is commonly assumed 
(cf. James and Quaglia 2018). This is because a tough stance against British attempts to 
“cherry-pick” access to financial markets is less tenable if EU27 firms are unable to pro-
cure vital financial services at competitive rates. The limited relocations to date are not 
nearly comprehensive enough to replace – much less challenge – London’s unique ser-
vice provision. Moreover, given the specialised nature of different EU27 financial cen-
tres, future relocations are prone to occur in a fragmented and decentralised manner.
This exacerbates a core dilemma for EU negotiators: how to wield a credible severance 
threat while European businesses, and indeed many governmental agencies, are exces-
sively dependent on the City’s financial ecosystem. Recognition of this dependence is 
increasingly clear to EU officials as the Brexit process progresses. This is why, in early 
2019, EU officials capitulated by agreeing to a range of contingency protections that 
would effectively preserve open financial relations with the UK in the event of a no-
deal Brexit. This move was discordant not only with the EU’s unwillingness to provide 
special dispensations for all other sectors but also with three years of messaging that a 
special carve-out for London was impossible (Kalaitzake 2020). Similarly, recognition 
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by EU banks of their deep reliance on London is why they consistently urge policymak-
ers to grant positive equivalence decisions and maintain relations that are “as strong as 
possible” (European Banking Federation 2020). 
By contrast, the British negotiating stance is one of increasing belligerence, beginning 
with Theresa May’s hard-line position of fully exiting the Single Market. While some 
analysts interpreted this as a sign of the declining influence of the City (James and 
Quaglia 2019a), from the perspective of UK officials, submission to future EU regula-
tion without a voice at the table (i.e. being a “rule taker”) is entirely inappropriate for a 
centre of London’s international standing. Moreover, operating from a “third country” 
position gives the UK more informal negotiating leverage over future EU regulatory de-
cisions, allowing the UK to advance a credible threat of selective divergence from rules 
considered detrimental to London’s competitiveness (Armour 2017).
In the context of substantial non-relocation, the Johnson government is even more con-
frontational. Conscious strategic positioning on the basis of London’s resilience is dem-
onstrated by Michael Gove, who, at a May 2020 House of Lords EU Select Committee, 
stated that, contrary to predictions, the number of transferred jobs and services had 
been “small…and unconcentrated” and that no “specific, single, rival centre of financial 
services” had emerged on the continent. As such, Gove argues that failure to agree on 
equivalence would be an “own goal” for the EU and that the loss of “access to one of 
the deepest and most liquid capital markets in the world” would do serious damage 
to EU27 businesses. On this basis, Gove expresses confidence that a deal on financial 
services is forthcoming, stressing that the EU equivalence framework is “primarily…a 
rules-based rather than a discretion-based process” (Gove 2020).
Undoubtedly, Gove’s argument is simultaneously part of a broader bargaining strategy 
that seeks to convince EU negotiators of the UK’s readiness to tolerate a no-deal Brexit, 
and thus coerce the EU into acceding to its demands. However, the crucial point is that 
the pressure exerted on EU negotiators is not merely a function of some subjectively 
constructed negotiating tactic but, more importantly, a consequence of the objective 
market developments outlined previously. Thus, to the extent that EU officials recognise 
the empirical reality of a broad non-relocation of financial services since 2016, it is an 
entirely legitimate fear that the EU economy will be injured by severing ties with Lon-
don. Similarly, to the extent that UK officials are cognisant of the City’s resilience, they 
can more confidently leverage this threat against their European counterparts. 
None of this suggests that the EU does not hold its own negotiating leverage or will 
inexorably succumb to this pressure. In the final instance, equivalence decisions are a 
matter for EU officials to authorise or not. As such, the EU could bargain concessions 
in financial services against other matters of contention. Alternatively, EU27 countries 
might be motivated to sever financial ties as a means to wean themselves off a dispro-
portionate dependence on London: as the EU’s chief negotiator puts it, “look[ing] be-
yond short-term adaptation and fragmentation costs, to our long-term interests” (Bar-
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nier 2020). Nevertheless, acknowledgement of these “costs” indicates the real trade-offs 
in play and underscores the basic analytic claim: in the context of London’s continuing 
resilience, UK negotiators wield genuine leverage over their EU counterparts. This fact 
is largely obscured by those working under an implicit (and unsubstantiated) assump-
tion of inevitable relocation.
Relative competitiveness
The evidence on relocation also illuminates the relative competitive strengths of the 
UK and EU financial system and their future prospects, especially as they are perceived 
by investors. On this score, London’s resilience testifies to the high level of confidence 
among market participants in the UK’s ability to chart a successful independent course 
in financial services. Multiple factors are at play here, many of which are not sufficiently 
accounted for in the extant literature on Brexit, yet are central to firms’ deliberations 
over their future commitment to the City.
First, while the EU is the UK’s largest exporting partner, City-based financial firms still 
derive only 24 percent (approximately £50/£208 billion) of their overall revenue from EU 
clients. Thus, more than three-quarters of their business is unconnected to Brexit nego-
tiations. Second, even the most basic equivalence agreement would protect a substantial 
share (approximately half) of this EU-related business, due to the fact that EU equiva-
lence measures are disproportionately available for exactly those areas in which the UK 
has a comparative advantage – that is, wholesale banking/capital market and infrastruc-
ture services (Armour 2017; Scarpetta and Booth 2016). Moreover, with the UK already 
in perfect alignment with EU rules – certainly more than any other existing third coun-
try equivalence partner such as the US or Japan – there is a strong bureaucratic rationale 
for regulators to approve equivalence in these key areas (James and Quaglia 2019b).
Third, even where the UK is not able to secure equivalence, the City will experience 
mitigating effects through two alternative means. First, nationally crafted market access 
regimes determined by individual EU27 member states,11 and second, well-established 
market workarounds that will enable City-based firms to continue servicing clients 
through opaque – but legal – transactions. This second path involves mechanisms such 
as reverse solicitation, back-to-back trading, conduit vehicles, portfolio delegation, as 
well as outsourcing measures (Arnold 2017). While some workarounds can potentially 
be curtailed by EU regulators, such restrictions would run contrary to the prominent 
EU goal of developing integrated and modern-functioning capital markets – not to 
11 This was a key avenue through which contingency planning for a no-deal outcome occurred in 
early 2019. For details, see Kalaitzake (2020, 18–19).
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mention that these very same workarounds are commonly used by EU27 banks to fa-
cilitate business in Latin America and Africa (Binham and Jones 2018).12
Fourth, looser ties with the EU opens the door to closer – and profitable – relations with 
other regions. For instance, the UK is seeking a fast-track deal in financial services with 
the US, which would solidify the prevailing Anglo-American dominance of global mar-
kets and standards (Hutton 2020). Also likely is a further pivot towards rapidly growing 
markets across Asia. Engagement with China, for instance, is a major strategic plank of 
UK policy in the post-crisis era, with London becoming the largest offshore Renminbi 
trading hub – controlling 44 percent of all transactions in 2019 and more than doubling 
its trading volume since the Brexit referendum (Green and Gruin 2020).13 This partner-
ship is also progressing through FinTech collaboration, the supervision and financing 
of large infrastructure projects, and the substantial relocation of Chinese financial and 
professional service firms into the City (Hall 2019).
Fifth, London possesses an array of unique strengths that are unlikely to be matched by 
rival EU centres in any near-term timeframe. Key examples include the City’s deep li-
quidity pools, mature capital markets, colocation and agglomeration synergies, cutting-
edge technological infrastructure, a competitive tax regime, the use of English law and 
language, highly customised products (e.g. in insurance and asset management), and 
tight functional interconnections with world-leading business schools. Brexit or not, 
these are major reasons for firms to resist premature disinvestment – a perspective that 
shines through in the data on US investment banks, Temporary Permissions Regime 
sign-up numbers, and the City’s FDI and FinTech performance. In short, incentives 
to leave the City will be tempered by investors’ concern with retaining access to these 
longstanding competitive advantages.
As regards Europe, limited relocation raises competitive concerns about that region’s 
financial system and the policy goal of further integration. Ironically, it is the drive for 
financial integration over the past two decades that has placed the EU in such an acute 
position of dependence vis-à-vis the City. Throughout this period of rapid liberalisation, 
London captured the majority of EU27 clients seeking access to sophisticated capital 
markets, while continental systems remained overwhelmingly bank-based. This engen-
dered a relatively organic division of financial labour, whereby London functions as the 
internationally connected wholesale banking hub of the region, while EU27 centres 
predominantly cater to their respective domestic economies (e.g. Paris and Frankfurt), 
or carve out niche roles in sub-sectors such as fund management (e.g. Dublin and Lux-
emburg).
12 Investment bank relocations were attenuated in part by the realisation that, irrespective of the 
loss of passporting, various market workarounds would enable them to preserve much of the 
commercial status quo (Arnold 2017). 
13 Again, contrary to expectations, the City has excelled in RMB currency trading since the Leave 
vote (Szalay 2019).
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Seen in this light, the EU’s failure to attract more business from London becomes less 
surprising and connects to a deeper story regarding the decline in international com-
petitiveness of EU27 centres over recent years. This is illustrated plainly in global fi-
nancial centre rankings. In 2007, Frankfurt and Paris held the sixth and eleventh spot 
respectively, yet by 2019 those centres had fallen to fifteenth and seventeenth. Over the 
same period, London remained either first or second, swapping places only with New 
York as the world’s leading centre. Similarly, while there were a total of eight EU-based 
financial centres (excluding British locations) in the top thirty in 2007, by 2019 this had 
reduced to just three (Mainelli and Yeandle 2007; Yeandle and Wardle 2019).14 
This decline is also driven by the debilitating effects of the eurozone crisis, including 
stagnant regional growth, weak bank profitability, and an inability to deal decisively 
with legacy losses. This has resulted in top European investment banks losing signifi-
cant market share to London-based rivals and has left the EU27 banking system in 
desperate need of consolidation (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 2016; Arnold 2018). In a 
very real sense, then, the post-referendum requirement to lure new business away from 
London and into continental centres has come at the most inopportune time for the EU.
One potential means to alleviate the excessive dependence on London is the Capital Mar-
kets Union (CMU) project, which aims to replace the fragmented interaction of national 
systems with an integrated provision of capital market services across the continent. This 
would not only reduce the disproportionate exposure of EU corporates to (nationally 
based) bank lending, but could also generate diverse sources of financing that are exter-
nal to the UK. The catch, however, is that the original plan to kick-start the CMU project 
was heavily premised upon leveraging the technical know-how of UK authorities, as well 
as the firepower of market intermediaries based in the City. Consequently, since the 2016 
referendum, the project has ground to a virtual standstill (Jenkins 2019).
At the present juncture, EU policymakers face a major dilemma regarding the future 
involvement of the City. On the one hand, London’s substantial engagement with the 
CMU will – at least in the short run – increase the reliance of EU27 countries on a fi-
nancial system operating outside of their supervisory purview. On the other, a determi-
nation to shut London out, while offering the prospect of reduced dependency over the 
long run, is likely to impede the project’s full development and create capital markets 
that are limited in scope and international influence (Faull and Gleeson 2019). How 
policymakers navigate this predicament will be a key determinant of Europe’s future 
financial standing.
14  EU27 centres have largely been displaced by Asian centres, six of which are now ranked in the 
top ten. Again, this indicates the large commercial reward that could come from the City redi-
recting its attention towards Asia’s rapidly developing financial markets.
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Theorising resilience
The discussion above identifies both contingent factors (equivalence expectations, mar-
ket workarounds, bilateral agreements, etc.) and structural factors (deep liquidity, co-
location, the legal system, etc.) as causally responsible for London’s resilience. However, 
fully explaining the “why” of resilience requires embedding these considerations into 
a broader theoretical account of the institutional transformation (or constancy) of fi-
nancial systems. Given space constraints, I advance here only a cursory overview of 
several theoretical frames that speak to the “stickiness” of London’s political-economic 
superiority.
One perspective envisages the City as one half of a broader “Anglo-American” domi-
nance in finance. As evidenced by the overwhelming presence of Wall Street institu-
tions, London is deeply entwined with the world’s other leading financial centre, New 
York, and, as such, its competitive position is substantially connected with the ongoing 
primacy of the US in international affairs (Fichtner 2017; Wójcik 2013). This “joint 
dominance” of “NY-LON” is consolidated by a close regulatory and legal alignment 
among supervisors, in turn promoted as a best-practice benchmark for the entire in-
dustry through supranational regulatory fora (Helleiner and Pagliari 2010).
The emergence of London’s vast Eurodollar market is perhaps the most salient illustra-
tion of how the City both thrives on, and sustains, the (infra)structural power of US 
finance in international affairs (Braun, Krampf, and Murau 2020; Green 2016). A simi-
lar dynamic is at play with regards to London’s aforementioned supremacy in FOREX 
dollar trading. As the world’s reserve currency, the dollar is an indispensable resource 
for global trading, commercial funding, and management of a state’s economic stability. 
By facilitating one of the largest markets for dollars and dollar-denominated assets in 
the world, then, the City can be conceived as a crucial foreign offshoot of US hegemony.
Hence, while Brexit might represent an exogenous shock to London’s EU-centred ex-
porting potential, it has done little to undermine its core connections to the US: for 
example, the commitment of US firms to maintain City-based headquarters, the dis-
proportionate flow of FDI and venture capital from US investors, the primacy of Lon-
don dealers in handling dollar transactions, and the close ideational alignment between 
US-UK supervisory officials. Unless the Brexit fallout begins to corrode these and other 
Anglo-American entanglements, it remains unlikely that the City will be displaced as 
the global financial centre of gravity.
A second perspective emphasises the stubborn “immobility” of critical knowledge-
based clusters in the modern economy. According to Iversen and Soskice, the ICT rev-
olution has ushered in a period of development whereby the specialised knowledge 
competencies and resources of leading economic sectors are geographically embedded 
within a small number of “big-city agglomerative peaks” (Iversen and Soskice 2019, 
188). London’s financial ecosystem is a prototypical example of such a peak. 
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As is well documented, the highly concentrated spatial interaction of complementary fi-
nancial firms and workers within London produces (and reproduces) positive spillover 
and network effects (see Cook et al. 2007). Firms (and their employees) across discrete 
financial sub-sectors create enduring relations of commercial trust and dependency, 
knowledge diffusion, and the capacity to dramatically compress costs compared to rival 
locations; closely related sectors (law, accountancy, consultancy, and technology) blos-
som around these clusters due to market incentives, skill overlaps, and the need for 
specialist suppliers; third-level institutions develop programs to produce the graduates 
required and training for future advancement; successful clustering fosters the creation 
of trailblazing technologies and advanced infrastructure. Indeed, London possesses the 
potent fusion of a world-leading financial and digital sector, ramping up opportunities 
for cross-sectoral partnership, employee/skill migration, funding, and innovation.
The key implication of this with regards to resilience is that financial firms are by no 
means “footloose” in the sense that they can easily turn their back on the City’s unique 
ecosystem (Iversen and Soskice 2019, 159). Exiting prematurely will not only diminish 
their capacity to leverage these benefits but also put them at an immediate disadvantage 
vis-à-vis their competitors. Even the most determined drive by rival centres to repli-
cate the City’s colocation clustering and knowledge agglomeration – a task made more 
difficult by the limits to EU27 financial integration – would take many years, perhaps 
decades, to bear fruit. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that firms are hesitant to 
relocate, adopting instead a “wait-and-see” approach before making any rash decisions. 
Moreover, even those that have decided to expand operations abroad have been sure to 
maintain the bulk of their business within London.
In short, London’s unrivalled “agglomeration peak” gives the UK government a crucial 
first mover advantage and, hypothetically, an unusual degree of autonomy in financial 
policymaking. Notably, the geographical dependence of financial firms on London’s ag-
glomeration benefits runs in direct opposition to the widespread understanding of fi-
nance as a thoroughly mobile form of investment, liberated from spatial commitments, 
and capable of disciplining policymakers through the threat of exit.
A final theoretical lens leverages the notion of “structural interdependence” and posits 
that UK and EU policymakers have exceptionally strong incentives to avoid major dis-
ruptions to cross-border financial relations (Kalaitzake 2020; Oatley 2019). This is be-
cause both economies are likely to be badly damaged by a major reconfiguration of the 
intricate and commercially vital entanglements between London and EU27 corporates, 
amassed over two decades of regional integration. Of course, this view highlights the 
previously discussed dependence of EU corporates on the City. However, it also hones 
in on the corresponding interest of UK officials in protecting the City’s profitability due 
to the centrality of finance to the UK’s internal debt/consumption-led growth model 
(Hay 2011).
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Given the strong path dependence in UK-EU financial integration, this perspective is 
perhaps the most bullish in anticipating an outcome that sees policymakers pull back 
from rhetorical brinksmanship to reach an amicable agreement – much like what oc-
curred in early 2019 (Kalaitzake 2020; Ringe 2018). At the very least, it indicates that 
one should not be surprised to find substantial equivalence arrangements eventually 
agreed upon, and arranged specifically to shield those core cross-border interactions 
relating to wholesale and capital markets.
One key strength of the interdependence lens is that it focuses attention on those agents 
that could most effectively work to deliver a mutually beneficial agreement – namely, 
technocratic supervisors/regulators. The expectation here is that officials from agencies 
such as the Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority, the European Central 
Bank, and the European Securities and Markets Authority are especially sensitive to 
disturbances stemming from severed financial ties and thus are motivated to engage 
in various means of transnational collaboration to mitigate the worst effects. More-
over, given their superior technical understanding of how financial markets work, these 
actors are well-placed to exert sway over negotiations and construct elaborate carve-
outs for financial sub-sectors. Along similar lines, for instance, James and Quaglia have 
shown how, on the fraught issue of euro clearing, the salience of “bureaucratic politics” 
among various supranational agencies has led the EU to shy away from a combative 
stance on CCP relocation policy, favouring instead a path of close regulatory coopera-
tion and “joint supervision” with UK authorities (James and Quaglia 2019b, 9–16).
Finally, structural interdependence presents an image of financial political power that 
is quite distinct from the perspective highlighting London’s agglomeration benefits. In 
the latter case, the fear of capital flight is said to be significantly neutralised, thus al-
lowing the UK government a high degree of policy autonomy. Structural interdepen-
dence, however, underscores the ways in which policymakers are uniquely constrained 
by long-established financial interactions and the challenges they face when attempting 
to roll back such complex entanglements. This bestows upon the financial sector an in-
direct, yet potent, means of influence over policy choices. As noted, the chief constraint 
for UK policymakers is the fact that their domestic growth model relies so heavily upon 
a prosperous, open, and globally operative financial centre. According to the rationality 
espoused by structural interdependence, then, these strictly economic incentives have 
the potential to overwhelm any political motivations to disengage entirely from the EU, 
at least in the crucial domain of finance.
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4 Conclusion
The evidence on relocation shows decisively that, since the 2016 referendum, the City 
of London has maintained – and in key instances advanced – its competitive lead over 
EU27 hubs. This is a confounding result for the majority of commentary that anticipates 
Brexit causing irreparable harm to the UK’s most prized economic sector. 
Of course, as the Brexit process moves forward, the evidence on transfers might well 
begin to change in light of new developments – for instance, negative equivalence as-
sessments due to a breakdown of negotiations and a disorderly Brexit, or, even in the 
context of an amicable settlement, the long-run impact of lost passporting rights. Nev-
ertheless, the data thus far strongly indicates that scholars should re-evaluate some core 
assumptions regarding relocation prospects and sharpen their understanding of the 
competitive motivations that underlie potential transfers.
In particular, researchers need to develop a more sophisticated account of the strate-
gic market calculations of financial participants. At present, the relocation thesis rests 
upon a simplistic and largely undifferentiated notion of capital flight and firm/inves-
tor behaviour. Undoubtedly, Brexit forces firms to deliberate over costly commercial 
preparations under highly uncertain circumstances. However, rather than leveraging 
the vague assumption that firms will relocate in order to retain existing EU27 clients, 
analysts should seek to provide a more fine-grained analysis of the costs, benefits, al-
ternative scenarios, and multiple strategies that are being weighed by different financial 
actors. This would advance a more investor-centred perspective on Brexit-related deci-
sions and likely yield a more variegated picture of how firms from different sub-sectors 
interpret their strategic options.
Researchers should also elaborate upon the factors that make the City a particularly re-
silient location despite the uncertainty surrounding Brexit. Of course, the existing litera-
ture emphasises London’s unmatched liquidity pools and agglomeration benefits derived 
from the clustering of financial services. As noted, however, London maintains a plethora 
of other distinctive advantages, some of which receive scant attention. A prime candidate 
is its highly advanced technological infrastructure. For example, transatlantic submarine 
cables transmit FOREX data from US markets to the City in milliseconds. Similarly, nu-
merous state-of-the-art data centres provide investors direct access to key price matching 
engines and data providers (Stafford 2017c). These technologies substantially power the 
City’s overwhelming dominance in trading markets – perhaps the most striking illustra-
tion of London’s post-referendum vitality. A similar focus might be trained on the City’s 
uniquely enabling FinTech environment, which, as demonstrated, continues to outflank 
continental rivals in terms of investment attraction and innovation. 
Lastly, researchers should give greater attention to the EU’s disproportionate level of 
dependence on UK financial services. At present, the focus is almost exclusively on the 
threat of Brexit to the City, while much too little analytical space is given to the potential 
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damage that might be inflicted on EU27 countries. Particularly important is the need 
to specify the dangers posed to EU corporates (both financial and non-financial) from 
losing access to the City and the strategies they are deploying (e.g. market workarounds, 
alternative providers, relocation to London, etc.) to mitigate such threats. At the supra-
national level, scholars should consider the impact of relocation trends on the position-
ing of EU officials regarding the future involvement of the City in European financial 
markets. As indicated, the willingness of EU officials to strike an independent path is 
very likely to be constrained – although not dictated – by a need to leverage the UK’s 
liquid and diverse markets in the service of regional stability and growth. This is perti-
nent not only with respect to immediate decisions on equivalence but also in relation to 
long-term choices over the direction of EU financial integration.
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